

# **PROFILE OF RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY THEN AND NOW**

By

Mark Denbeaux

Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law and  
Director of Seton Hall Law Center for Policy and Research,  
Joshua Denbeaux, and R. David Gratz,  
Denbeaux & Denbeaux  
Counsel to two Guantánamo detainees

Co-Authors

Adam Deutsch, James Hlavenka, Gabrielle Hughes, Brianna Kostecka,  
Michael Patterson, Paul Taylor, and Anthony Torntore  
Fellows Center for Policy and Research

Contributors

Fellows Center for Policy and Research:  
Grace Brown, Jillian Camarote, Douglas Eadie, Jennifer Ellick,  
Daniel Lorenzo, Mark Muoio

Senior Fellows Center for Policy and Research:  
Matthew Darby, Shana Edwards, John Gregorek, Daniel Mann,  
Megan Sassaman, and Helen Skinner

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RELEASES DETAINEES WITHOUT REGARD TO ANYTHING EXCEPT THEIR NATIONALITY.

1. By November 2006, 45% of all detainees ever held at Guantánamo Bay were released from the prison.
2. A previous profile based upon the Government summary of classified evidence revealed that more than 55% of those ever detained in Guantánamo were never alleged to have committed hostile acts against US or Coalition forces; 60% of all detainees were nothing more than associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban and no more than 8% of those were accused of being fighters.
3. The releases of prisoners from Guantánamo before 2007 show a clear pattern in terms of nationality and no pattern at all with respect to other presumably relevant factors.

### THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT DETAINEES WERE RELEASED AFTER AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THEIR DETENTION WAS BASED.

4. One would expect that detainees who were merely “associated with” a group would be released before “members of” that group and both would be released before “fighters for” that group. It should also be expected that non-al Qaeda would be released before al Qaeda.
5. The 8% alleged to be fighters were released at the same rate as the 60% alleged to be merely associated with terrorist groups.
6. The 34% which were referred to as al Qaeda were released at the same rate as those who were Taliban or neither Taliban nor al Qaeda.
7. In fact, according to the Department of Defense's own data, slightly more “fighters for” were released than “members of” or those “associated with” al Qaeda or the Taliban. 75 of 156 released detainees whose profile are available were released even though the Government has previously alleged that they are al Qaeda.
8. Almost 60% of the detainees released from Guantánamo, among those with a CSRT, are alleged to be at least associated with al Qaeda.
9. 28.8% of released detainees are alleged members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban or both.
10. 29% of the 321 released detainees who are said to have been associated with al Qaeda or the Taliban have been released to freedom and an additional 52% were transferred to the custody of a foreign government, the meaning of which is not clear.
11. Alleged *fighters* have been released at a rate **greater than** that for alleged *members* and *associates*.
12. *Fighters* were released an average of 43 days earlier than detainees merely *associated* with a terrorist organization, and 57 days earlier than those who were *members* of a terrorist organization.
13. Those alleged to be merely associated with a terrorist organization comprise 57.6% of all those with a CSRT, and 56.4% of those released.

#### WEST POINT AND DANGEROUSNESS.

14. If there is any correlation of release date to West Point's criteria evaluating dangerousness of detainee, it is that the more dangerous the detainee the earlier the release.

#### THE CORRELATION OF DETAINEES' RELEASE TO THEIR NATIONALITY IS VERY STRONG.

15. Detainees were released based solely upon their nationalities.

#### INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES.

16. Pakistani, Afghani and Saudi detainees were released first, without regard to the classified evidence.
17. Yemeni, Algerian and Chinese detainees were released last, if at all, without regard to the purported classified evidence.
18. Detainees from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been released without apparent regard to the evidence alleged against them; conversely detainees from Yemen, Algeria, and China have been held without apparent regard to the strength or weakness of the evidence against them.

#### NATIONALITIES.

19. Detainees at Guantánamo Bay come from 44 countries; however 75% of the detainees are from only 6 countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, China Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.
20. 60% of detainees from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia have been released, constituting over 71% of all detainees released from Guantánamo.
21. 9.7% of detainees from Algeria, China, and Yemen have been released, constituting 4.2% of all detainees released.
22. 69% of detainees from Afghanistan, which is the largest group of detainees by nationality, have been released from Guantánamo. Of those released 42% have been granted freedom and none have been released for prosecution.
23. Pakistani detainees have been released at a rate of 92.4%.
24. Nearly half of the Pakistani detainees are alleged to have performed a hostile act against the US or its allies.
25. 30.7% of those detainees from Saudi Arabia have been released. 44% of these are associated with Al Qaeda while an additional 28% are associated with both Taliban and al Qaeda.
26. Less than 8% of the 108 detainees from Yemen have been released from Guantánamo
27. Only 4% of the detainees from Algeria have been released from Guantánamo.
28. On average, detainees alleged to be fighters for terrorist organizations were released earlier than those who were merely associates of the organizations.

#### NATIOINALITY GROUPS.

29. Detainees from Arabic-speaking nations have been released on average 10 months later than those from post-Soviet nations, and 21 months later than those from nations which are traditional US allies.

RETURNED TO THE FIGHT AND AFGHANISTAN.

30. The nationality with the largest number of detainees is Afghanistan. Afghans are also the largest number released; Afghans are the detainees who are most likely to be released to freedom upon their return to their home country and Afghans comprise the largest number of detainees who purportedly returned to the fight.
31. According to the Department of Defense, as of June 13, 2008 of the 8 former Guantánamo detainees who were alleged to have returned to the battlefield, 6 were from Afghanistan. 1 was from Russia and 1 was from Kuwait.

There is no evidence that detainees were released based upon the evidence against them. If the Government had in fact believed its own evidence, and had not subsequently disregarded it in favor of distinctions based upon nationality alone, those with the least and weakest evidence against them would have been released first, and those with the most and strongest evidence against them would never have been released at all. In fact, the opposite is true, as the example of ISNs 95 and 681 illustrate.

ISN 95: ABDUL RAHMAN UTHMAN AHMED, Saudi Arabia  
Released 5/18/2006

- 3a. The detainee is associated with al Qaida and is a Taliban fighter:
  1. The detainee accepted a fatwa from the Saad Bin Moad Mosque in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to fight for the Taliban against the Northern Alliance.
  2. The detainee traveled from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan via Pakistan during Summer 2001.
  3. The detainee received weapons training on the Kalishnikov rifle at a Kandahar guesthouse.
  4. The detainee's name is on a computer list of al Qaida mujahidin seized during raids of al Qaida safehouses in Pakistan.
- 3b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.
  1. The detainee carried a Kalishnikov while on the front lines in the Konduz area.
  2. The detainee fought on the Konduz front lines with an Arab unit led by Abu Moazh.
  3. The detainee was on the battlefield on 11 September 01.
  4. The detainee surrendered to General Dostum, along with 450-600 other Taliban fighters.
  5. The detainee was sent to the Al-Janki prison in Mazar-e-Sharif, where he was present during the prison uprisings.

ISN: 681 MOHAMMED MOHAMMED HASSEN, Yemen  
Not Released as of 2007

- 3a. The detainee is an al Qaida associate.
  1. Detainee, a Yemen citizen who traveled to Pakistan in early 2001, was captured at the 'Crescent Mill' guesthouse in Faisalbad, Pakistan and was identified by a senior al Qaida lieutenant
  2. A senior al Qaida Lieutenant identified detainee in a photo as having possibly seen him in Afghanistan.

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## **I. Profiling the Released Detainees**

The Center undertook to ascertain release data for detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba and to compare that data to other variables in a search for correlations. This effort required analysis of numerous governmental sources. As documented in the Center's first report, *A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data*, the majority of detainees in Guantánamo Bay were never alleged to have committed hostile acts against U.S. or Coalition forces and 60% of all detainees were merely "associated" with al Qaeda or the Taliban. The determination of which detainees were released and when they were released is the culmination of over two years of gathering and reviewing data released by the Department of Defense.<sup>1</sup> This data, which was produced either voluntarily or as the result of litigation and Freedom of Information Act requests by the media and other public interest groups, has enabled the Center to uncover the connection between the nationality of detainees, the allegations against them, and their release dates. At this point, enough information has been produced to compile a reliable profile of those detainees who have been released from Guantánamo Bay.

### **A. The Data Sources**

The Center started with a review of an Associated Press Freedom of Information Act request, which obtained a summary of classified evidence regarding the status of detainees at Guantánamo Bay from their CSRT hearings. Later, on April 19, 2006, the Government released documents showing the Internment Serial Numbers (ISN) along with the names of the 558 detainees who had Combat Status Review Tribunals (CSRT). On May 15, 2006, the Government

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<sup>1</sup> Because the method used to create the release model uses the date of the last recorded weight as a criterion of release before November 2006, the three detainees who committed suicide in June 2006 are included among those released. Because this is a small percentage of those listed as released, the effect on any findings is minimal.

published the names of all 759 men who had ever been detained at Guantánamo. This latter list allows an inference of the number of detainees who never had a CSRT, and were therefore presumed released or transferred at some point before the CSRT process began.

In addition, the Government released Administrative Review Board (ARB) data. The ARB determines whether detainees should *continue* to be detained, taking into account the findings of a detainee's CSRT. This information was combined with "R1" data, that is, the unclassified summary of the evidence for each detainee. In turn, this information was cross-correlated with the dates and put together with ISN, nationality, and the "profile" of the 558 detainees who received CSRT hearings. For the R1 data, the report takes the Government at its word that the R1 presents a fair and accurate summary of the classified evidence as required by the Freedom of Information Act. Finally, the analysis also included prior Center analysis breaking down the allegations against the detainees in terms of hostile acts committed against U.S. or Coalition forces.<sup>2</sup>

Complicating this effort was the failure of the Department of Defense to specify the release of detainees by ISN. However, the Detention Hospital Guantánamo Bay Cuba Standard Operating Procedures ("Operating Procedures") for the hospital at Guantánamo require that detainees in the camp are to be weighed once every thirty-days. Each weighing for a given individual was recorded by ISN. When weight data for a particular detainee stopped, the Center inferred that the detainee had been released.

However, the weight data, which includes the ISN of the detainees, does not include the nationality. Therefore, to determine the nationality of a given detainee, the Center cross-referenced the ISN with data released separately by the Department of Defense. Together, this

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<sup>2</sup> Though 516 detainees R1 records were reviewed initially, another 42 records were produced by DOD subsequent to The Center's initial report. As a result, the original numbers from the first report have changed slightly.

information yielded a picture of those being released and when they were released. Trends pertaining to individual nationality emerged showing that certain detainees were more likely than others to be released to particular countries. In addition, the Department of Defense published reports on the times, dates and descriptions of disciplinary violations. This additional information helped correlate the ISN and nationality information with the weight data.

After a thorough review of the weight data, additional information was obtained by a review of press releases by the Department of Defense itself.<sup>3</sup> These announcements, which are freely available to the public on the Department of Defense DefenseLink website, contain information regarding the number of people released to each nation, and in many cases, the basis for the release or transfer (CSRT, ARB, R1, etc).

This information was useful in two ways. First, Department of Defense announcements for 2005 and 2006 helped confirm release dates by last available weight data for many detainees. The number of detainees released or transferred to a particular nation as announced by the Department of Defense could then be compared with the weight data estimates of releases.

Second, weight data for a period beyond early 2007 is not available, and even the data for late 2006 is not a wholly reliable indicator of release dates. As mentioned above, the Operating Procedures mandate that detainees should be weighed at least once every thirty days. However, the data showed gaps in the weights for some detainees that, in some cases, greatly exceeded this thirty-day period. The number of detainees released to specific countries in 2007 and early 2008 provided more of the overall picture of how nationality was related to the release or transfer of individuals held in Guantánamo. In addition, the weight data was also compared to variables that included the number of paragraphs in the charges against specific detainees in their R1 documents, along with the alleged association and nexus alleged of each detainee and whether

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix D.

the detainee was charged with a hostile or non-hostile act. This comparison led to the finding that whether a detainee is alleged to be a fighter for, member of, or associated with either the Taliban or al Qaeda has little correlation to the likelihood that the detainee is transferred or released.

After comparing the alleged association and nexus of the detainees in R1 documents to their corresponding release dates, the Center juxtaposed this with variables indicating the alleged level of danger based on the Pentagon-commissioned West Point study. This study evaluated the level of danger of each detainee, based on reviewing the unclassified CSRT hearing summaries. A graphical comparison of the data makes evident that there was no correlation between a given detainee's dangerousness and the likelihood that he would be released or transferred to another nation.

The Center analysis reveals that the continued detention of some in Guantánamo and the release of other detainees was without regard to purported evidence and without regard to the factors identified in the Pentagon-commissioned West Point. Instead, the constant was nationality. Decisions correlating only with nationality suggest that political considerations were at work, rather than individual assessments of the evidence against each detainee.

## **II. Methodology of Report**

To estimate the release dates of detainees, the Center employed a model that combined information from the Department of Defense weight data, the Department of Defense press releases that listed detainee releases and transfers, and CSRT and ARB information.<sup>4</sup>

Specifically, the date of a detainee's final weighing (*MaxDate*), along with the CSRT dates and

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<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of analysis, this report accepts all government statements as true and complete, and that R1s accurately represent a summary of the classified evidence against the detainee.

ARBs, provided the information necessary to determine an initial approximate date of release. This initial date, along with a detainee's nationality, was compared to the information published in the Department of Defense press releases to match ISN information to the probable date of release. Since the Department of Defense does not usually provide the nationality of released detainees, the nation to which individuals were sent was used in lieu of nationality, and compared to the known nation of origin of the detainees. The data revealed that, on average, 51 days passed from the date of a detainee's last weighing to the date of his release. The Department of Defense does not always publicize the release of detainees. Therefore, for those detainees not matched to a press release, the release date used was that date 51 days after their final weighing.<sup>5</sup>

### **III. The Release of Detainees from the Guantánamo Bay Detention Facility: By the Numbers**

#### **A. Summary**

Department of Defense documents show that the Detention Facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba has held a total of 773 prisoners since early 2002. These prisoners have nationalities representing 44 countries. However 75% of the detainees are from six countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. No other country contributes more than 2% of the total population. Prior to the end of 2006, 45% (354) of all detainees were released from Guantánamo. In addition, there are 201 detainees who have not undergone a CSRT review. The Government has not provided meaningful information regarding these 201 detainees, but all were released from Guantánamo Bay by November 2006. In addition, there are 14 more recent arrivals from CIA "black sites" for whom the Center does not have R1 summaries. For each of

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<sup>5</sup> The methodology of this report is more fully explained in Appendix C.

the remaining 578 detainees who have undergone the CSRT process, substantial information is available regarding their alleged association with terrorist organizations, alleged hostile acts undertaken, weight data, and release information.<sup>6</sup> The available data suggests that there is little correlation between release dates for detainees and their alleged hostile acts or association with al Qaeda or the Taliban.

Of the 577 detainees for whom there are available profiles, those who were determined to have a relationship with a terrorist group were placed in one of the following classifications: al Qaeda, Taliban, al Qaeda & Taliban, al Qaeda or Taliban, none alleged, and unidentified. The nexus, or type of relationship the detainees are alleged to have with the above organizations, is further categorized as “associated with,” “fighter for,” “member of,” and none alleged.

Of the detainees released, documents verify that 31 have been released for further detainment abroad, 104 have been released to foreign governments, 95 were released for freedom, and 3 were released for further prosecution.

Where detainees were released to foreign governments there is no specification as to their status following transfer. For those released to a foreign government, their fate and whereabouts presumably remain unknown to the Government and have been placed in the control of nations such as Pakistan and Afghanistan.

### ***B. Association and Nexus***

There have been a total of 184 detainees whom the US found to be *associated with* al Qaeda. Of these detainees, 43, or 12% of all detainees released from Guantánamo, have been *associated with* al Qaeda (27.6% of all who had CSRTs). The overwhelming majority of al

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<sup>6</sup> In the newly released records, the DoD produced the same R1 for two different detainees. Thus, the DoD has produced R1s for 557 of the 558 detainees that had CSRTs. The detainee whose R1 is missing is ISN 271, a Saudi national named Ibrahim Muhammed Ibrahim Al Nasir who was likely released on 18 May 2006.

Qaeda associates released from Guantánamo (25 detainees) have been transferred to the control of a foreign government.

This means that the US has relinquished control over these detainees and has left a foreign entity to determine their fate.


Of the 131 detainees allegedly associated with the Taliban, 39% (51) have been released.

Among these, 22% have been released to freedom while 59% have been transferred to the control of a foreign government.

There are a total of 148 detainees associated with both al Qaeda and Taliban, 22% of which have been released from Guantánamo.

Finally, of those classified as associated with al Qaeda or Taliban, 15% of the 39 have been released from Guantánamo.

Thus, detainees who were found to have a relationship with either al Qaeda or the Taliban, but for whom the CSRT did not reach a conclusive determination of which group they were associated with, were released at a substantially greater rate than those who were found conclusively associated with al Qaeda.



<b>Association</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Released</b>	<b>% Released</b>
<i>Al Qaeda</i>	184	43	23%
<i>Taliban</i>	131	51	39%
<i>Al Qaeda &amp; Taliban</i>	148	32	22%
<i>Al Qaeda or Taliban</i>	39	6	15%

Nearly 25% of the 321 detainees *associated with* one of these terrorist groups were released to freedom, while 52% were transferred to a foreign government. There have been 49 detainees who were classified as having fought for the terrorists. Of these 49, either 2 or 3 were transferred to a foreign government for further detainment; 10 or 11 were transferred to foreign governments without specified conditions for their treatment; and 2 were released to freedom.

With respect to *members* of the terrorist organization, 45 detainees (28.8% of all detainees released from Guantánamo who had a CSRT) were found to be members of al Qaeda, the Taliban or both. 20% of these members were released to freedom and 69% were transferred to a foreign government. There are 10 detainees who have been found to have a relationship with a terrorist group, but who have no nexus alleged. Of these 10 detainees, 9 are from Afghanistan.


Of the 17 *fighters* released from Guantánamo only one was released for prosecution.

## 1. Little correlation to nexus to terrorist activity and date of release

Detainment periods show minimal correlation to the alleged terrorist activity of detainees.<sup>7</sup> The median dates of those detainees alleged to be fighters, associates, or members of a terrorist group varied by a single calendar day. Surprisingly, of those detainees for whom there was no allegations of nexus or association, 50% were never released, thus receiving treatment no different than those who were found to be members of the Taliban or al Qaeda. The mean release dates show greater variation. The 17 alleged *fighters* were released an average of 43 days earlier than detainees merely *associated with* a terrorist organization, and 57 days earlier than those who were only members. These numbers contradict the common perception that a fighter poses a greater danger to the war on terror than does an associate or member.<sup>8</sup>

Even as fighters are being released at a greater rate than members or those simply associated with terrorist organizations, this increased rate of release has little demographic impact on the population held at Guantánamo.

The proportion of alleged fighters has dropped from only 9% of all ever held at Guantánamo to 8% of those remaining. Likewise, the percentage of *members* and *associates* does not change by more than a single percent. Based on this data, a detainee's



<sup>7</sup> See Paragraph 3a Allegations, Graphical Appendix A, pp. 14, 15 and 17.

<sup>8</sup> The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (CTC) agrees with the assessment that fighters represent the most dangerous class of detainees. A CTC study requested by the DoD found that “[e]vidence of performing the role of a fighter was—as expected—the most statistically and substantively significant predictor of ... hostilities against the United States or Coalition Allies.” JOSEPH FELTER & JARRET BRACHMAN, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR, AN ASSESSMENT OF 516 COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL (CSRT) UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARIES 34 (25 July 2007), available at <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/csrt/CTC-CSRT-Report-072407.pdf>. The study also found that “[e]vidence of being a fighter boosts the chances of ... commitment to jihad by 16%.” *Id.* at 35.

nexus to a terrorist organization does not appear to have been a serious consideration in the decision to release or continue detention.

## **2. Little correlation between association to al Qaeda and/or Taliban and date of release**

There is surprisingly little correlation between association with a terrorist group and a detainee's release date from Guantánamo.<sup>9</sup> On average, persons associated with al Qaeda were detained approximately two months longer than those associated with the Taliban. Persons associated with both al Qaeda and the Taliban were detained for almost identical periods of time as were those merely associated with al Qaeda. The persons detained the longest at Guantánamo were the 39 detainees alleged to be associated with *either* al Qaeda or the Taliban. For this last group, the Government data suggests that there was uncertainty as to which group the detainees were associated but that once a detainee's association was determined that detainee's release followed shortly thereafter. For each of these groups, the median date of release lies on either the 19<sup>th</sup> or the 24<sup>th</sup> of November 2006. In other words, of those associated with *any* terrorist organization, 50% were never released.<sup>10</sup> Viewing the data as demographic compositions of the yearly population provides a different perspective of the same picture: little or no distinction between groups.<sup>11</sup> The data shows that detainees were not treated according to varying degrees of seriousness or level of potential danger depending on the terrorist organization with which they were allegedly associated.

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<sup>9</sup> See Paragraph 3a Allegations, Graphical Appendix A, pp. 14, 15 and 17.

<sup>10</sup> See Appendix C.

<sup>11</sup> See Appendix A, p. 13.

### ***C. Allegations of Hostile Acts Has Inverse Impact on Date of Release***

Of the 558 detainees who received CSRTs, 47% have been accused of hostile acts. Those accused of hostile acts have been released slightly *later* on average than those not accused of any hostile acts. This conclusion is supported by the 59-day difference in the mean *MaxDate*, and a 16-day difference in mean release date. The larger difference in mean *MaxDate* is due to the fact that proportionally more of those not alleged to have committed hostile acts have been released. This issue is addressed later in this report.

#### **1. Number of 3a / 3b counts reveal detainees with more counts released sooner than those with fewer counts**

As part of the CSRT process, detainees received a summary of the classified evidence (an “R1”) against them. This document included two paragraphs of allegations supporting their alleged association and nexus with al Qaeda, the Taliban, or both, and any alleged hostile acts. Detainees receiving a Paragraph 3a, noting their association with a terrorist organization, received anywhere from 0-23 counts supporting the claim of association. Any alleged hostile acts were noted separately, in Paragraph 3b of the R1. At first, there appears to be a correlation between the number of 3a allegations made and the date of release, where those with fewer allegations are released earlier. However, this correlation is not significant: the number of allegations is normally distributed around 5.5. This means that those with 14, 15, 16, 23, and 0 allegations are not statistically significant because they are outliers. When these points are omitted, the apparent correlation falls apart. In fact, it appears that any correlation that does exist is inverse, with the detainees with the most charges against them, and therefore presumably the most dangerous or at least the most likely to have been guilty, being released the earliest. The most common number of 3a allegations was 4, totaling 17% of the 557 detainees who underwent the CSRT process. However, there were 35 detainees who received 10-13 allegations in their

paragraph 3a. Those detainees with the high number of counts were, on average, released prior to those receiving only 4 counts. It appears that, in many instances, where more evidence existed to confirm the detainee's alleged association and nexus, the release rate was higher and occurred more quickly. Based on this finding, it appears that the Government's evidentiary support for its allegations of a detainee's connection to a terrorist organization has not been a serious or consistent consideration when determining whether to release or continue to detain detainees.<sup>12</sup>

The 3b data presents a similar scenario. Initially, it may appear that detainees are detained longer than others when their R1's list more allegations that support claims of hostile acts, but this apparent correlation does not survive closer inspection. Of the 557 detainees for whom an R1 is available, 295 are not alleged to have committed any hostile acts. Of those who are alleged to have committed a hostile act, the number of allegations is normally distributed around 2.8. Those categories farthest from the mean number of allegations, which represent a very small proportion of the population, are not significant. When those categories are removed from consideration—namely, those with 6 or more 3b allegations—the apparent correlation between fewer allegations and earlier release vanishes, and may in fact reverse.<sup>13</sup>

This reverse correlation is clear in that those detainees with 2 to 5 allegations of hostile activity were on average released between 1 and 3 months earlier than those who had only 1 allegation of hostile activity. Likewise, those with 4 and 5 allegations were released on average more than 2 months earlier than those with only 1, 2, or 3 allegations against them. These findings make clear that, here as well, the Government's own evidentiary support for its allegations of a detainee's hostile acts has never been a factor seriously or consistently considered in the decision to release or continue detention of such detainee.

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<sup>12</sup> See *Id.* at 17.

<sup>13</sup> See *Id.* at 18.

#### ***D. CTC Factors Not Consistently Applied***

According to West Point's Combating Terror Center ("CTC"), detainees can be further categorized by a series of factors measuring the risk they pose in the war on terror.<sup>14</sup> The twelve factors are divided into three categories, with four factors in each: 1) "Low Risk" representing characteristics demonstrating that a detainee is acquainted with dangerous persons, 2) "Medium Risk" suggesting that the detainee poses a probable risk, and 3) "High Risk" representing characteristics that the specified detainee poses a demonstrated risk. The CTC categorized 516 detainees based on the number of factors they held at each risk level. As with the Government's evidentiary factors, there appears to be a slight correlation between the CTC factors met by a detainee and their release date. However, the significance of this correlation is very low.<sup>15</sup>

##### **1. "Medium" and "High" risk detainees held for less time than "Low" risk detainees**

In fact, as with the number of 3a and 3b allegations, there appears to be an inverse correlation with release date. Of those having two of the four risk factors, there were 123 in the High Risk group, 142 in the Medium Risk group and 120 at the Low Risk group. The mean release date for detainees having two risk factors was nearly identical at the Medium and High risk levels. These detainees were released on average 36 days earlier than those with two risk factors in the Low category. Detainees with only two out of four risk factors at the Medium and High risk levels were also released on average before persons with three and four risk factors at the Low level. The release data for those having three of the four risk factors mirrors the above

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<sup>14</sup> While the CTC factors are not an officially recognized evidentiary basis for detention, they were a system of analyzing the officially recognized R1s, and was created at the behest of the DoD. If the R1s contain information which is used in the decision to release or continue detention, correlation between the CTC factors and the date of release is to be expected.

<sup>15</sup> See Appendix B.

finding. Detainees with three risk factors at the High and Medium threat level were released approximately three weeks prior to those having three factors of Low risk. In other words, those detainees of “lower risk” were released on same date and later than those with more factors. Among those detainees who West Point finds have the most evidence against them, the more dangerous are released first. If the Medium and High risk levels represent the likelihood that a detainee poses a threat, one would think that such detainees would also satisfy categories in the Low threat status, since the later merely represents that a detainee knows dangerous persons. On the contrary, there appears to be little correlation between West Point risk factors met by a detainee and their date of release. However, there is a correlation demonstrating that the more factors a detainee has and the greater danger he represents, the sooner and more likely he is released from Guantánamo.

#### **IV. Pattern of Release Explained by Nationality**

While the data demonstrates little or no correlation between the severity of the accusations against the detainees and their release date, one characteristic has shown a significant correlation: country of origin. It is important to define “release” prior to discussing the release data for detainees by country. While the definition of release might seem clear, the Department of Defense’s data constructs a rather mottled definition. Of the detainees released up to November 2006, only 27% have been officially “released to freedom.” Another 29% of detainees have been “released to foreign governments.” A further 9% have been released for detention abroad and 1% have been released for prosecution. Strikingly, 34% have no

documented release category. The following charts and descriptions review the breakdown of releases from those nations with the most detainees in Guantánamo.<sup>16</sup>

**A. Nations with High Numbers of Released Detainees**

**1. Afghanistan**

The data demonstrates what is expected—the country with the largest number of detainees is Afghanistan. Surprisingly, however, nearly 70% of those detained from Afghanistan were released by November of 2006. As indicated by the mean release date of March 30, 2005, the release of

Total	Released	% Released
216	149	69.3

Afghanistan detainees has been steady from the beginning of 2003. Of those Afghani’s released, 57 detainees had a CSRT, 32% were alleged to have committed hostile acts and 65% were alleged to be connected with al Qaeda, the Taliban or both.

Release Date		
	Model	MaxDate
<b>Mean</b>	09/05/2004	03/30/2005
<b>Median</b>	03/15/2004	04/01/2005

Only 1% of Afghanistan detainees who were released were sent for continued detention in Afghanistan. In addition, almost 70% of all Afghani detainees were released. However, the majority (42%) were not released for continued detention, but for freedom.

Fighter	Member	Associated	Alleged Hostile Act	Al-Qaeda	Taliban	Al Qaeda & Taliban	Al Qaeda or Taliban
2.8%	23.5%	27.2%	42%	2.8%	23.5%	13.4%	2.8%

<sup>16</sup> For group and individual charts see Appendix A, pp. 3-7.

## 2. Pakistan

Of the six countries representing more than 2% of the population in Guantánamo, the one with the most released detainees is Pakistan, with 61 of 66 detainees released. However, over 67% of Pakistanis released who had a CSRT were alleged to

Total	Released	% Released
66	61	94%

Release Date		
	Model	MaxDate
<b>Mean</b>	06/30/2004	07/13/2004
<b>Median</b>	09/18/2004	08/15/2004

have committed a hostile act. Furthermore, over 40% of all those released were sent back to Pakistan for continued detention. As we have seen, in contrast, only 1% of Afghanistan detainees who were released were sent for continued detention in Afghanistan. In addition, almost 70% of Afghanistan detainees were released not for continued detention, but the majority for freedom (42%). The majority of Pakistani detainees were released relatively quickly, with a mean release date in July of 2004.

Fighter	Member	Associated	Alleged Hostile Act	Al Qaeda	Taliban	Al Qaeda & Taliban	Al Qaeda or Taliban
4.5%	10.6%	4.5%	46%	6.1%	10.6%	3%	0%

## 1. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is unique among the top six countries in that it is the only one with a high release rate that has not seen 50% of its population released as of November 2006. In 2007, 63 additional detainees were released to Saudi Arabia.<sup>17</sup> Assuming that a majority of these are Saudi nationals, more than half of Saudi detainees have been released as of the end of 2007. However, the data set depicted in this report is current as of November of 2006.<sup>18</sup>

Total	Released	% Released
137	42	31%

Release Date		
	Model	MaxDate
<b>Mean</b>	12/16/2005	08/03/2006
<b>Median</b>	05/18/2006	11/19/2006

Fighter	Member	Associated	Alleged Hostile Act	Al Qaeda	Taliban	Al Qaeda & Taliban	Al Qaeda or Taliban
11.7%	27%	56.9%	52%	40.9%	20.4%	29.2%	3.6%

<sup>17</sup> See DoD press releases 11591, 11477, 11301, 11130, and 10536.

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix C.

**A. Nations with Low Numbers of Released Detainees**

The Department of Defense data reveals that certain nations’ detainees are less likely than others to be released from Guantánamo. This is most clearly delineated by the release rates of Yemeni and Algerian detainees.

**1. Yemen**

A total of 8 out of 108 Yemeni detainees have been released. Compare this to a release rate of 94% of Pakistani detainees. Additionally, only 2 of 108 Yemeni detainees have been released for freedom. 1.8% of Yemeni detainees have attained freedom from Guantánamo compared to 42% of

<b>Total</b>	<b>Released</b>	<b>% Released</b>
108	8	7%

Afghani detainees. The reason for the disparate treatment is not clear since there is no significant difference in accusations against the two groups. One theory is that the higher percentage of hostile acts alleged against Yemeni detainees—62% compared to a total population average of 47%—causes their continued detention. This is disproven, however, by the counterexample of Algeria, with its 36% hostile acts alleged.

<b>Release Date</b>		
	<b>Model</b>	<b>MaxDate</b>
<b>Mean</b>	05/13/2006	11/04/2006
<b>Median</b>	12/17/2006	11/24/2006

<b>Fighter</b>	<b>Member</b>	<b>Associated</b>	<b>Alleged Hostile Act</b>	<b>Al Qaeda</b>	<b>Taliban</b>	<b>Al Qaeda &amp; Taliban</b>	<b>Al Qaeda or Taliban</b>
6.5%	33.3%	58.3%	62%	38%	16.7%	30.6%	10.2%

## 2. Algeria

Similar to Yemeni detainees, only 4% of Algerian detainees have been released. However, Algerian detainees have the lowest percentage of alleged hostile acts among the groups in Guantánamo. Despite this, an Algerian detainee is 24 times less likely to be released than a Pakistani detainee. In addition, unlike detainees from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algerian detainees' condition of release is not documented.

Total	Released	% Released
25	1	4%

Release Date		
	Model	MaxDate
<b>Mean</b>	10/22/2005	11/18/2006
<b>Median</b>	10/22/2005	11/25/2006

Fighter	Member	Associated	Alleged Hostile Act	Al Qaeda	Taliban	Al Qaeda & Taliban	Al Qaeda or Taliban
4%	36%	60%	36%	72%	4%	16%	4%

### 3. China


The Chinese detainees present a special case. All detainees of Chinese nationality are ethnic Uighurs, an Islamic minority from western China. The Department of Defense has admitted that the Uighurs are not, and never were, a threat to the US or its Coalition partners in Afghanistan. However, they cannot be returned to China because of their suspected secessionist aims. Thus, 6 of the 22 Uighurs were released to Albania. However, the other 16 remain detained at Guantánamo, despite the lack of any basis for such detention. Indeed, while 45% of all detainees have been released, 73% of the Uighurs remain confined.

Total	Released	% Released
22	6	27%

Release Date		
	Model	MaxDate
<b>Mean</b>	03/21/2006	09/04/2006
<b>Median</b>	02/23/2006	11/24/2006

Fighter	Member	Associated	Alleged Hostile Act	Al Qaeda	Taliban	Al Qaeda and Taliban	Al Qaeda or Taliban
13.6%	13.6%	72.7%	41%	18.2%	22.7%	13.6%	13.6%

Comparing release rates of these nations strongly indicates that many detainees are being released on the basis of nationality alone. Conversely, many detainees for whom little or no evidence exists are still being held after five years of detention. This disparity of treatment is evident in the demographic makeup of the Guantánamo population when viewed on an annual basis.<sup>19</sup>



***B. Nationality Groups Confirm that Political Distinctions Drive the Release Decisions***

Of the 381 detainees from nations where Arabic is an official language, only 89 detainees (23.4%) have been released as of the end of 2006. This is significantly lower than the 45.8% of all combined detainees who were released in the same period. This late release is also in stark contrast to other major nationality groups. Of the 33 detainees from post-Soviet nations, 15 (45.5%) have been released as of the beginning of 2007. In fact, all but one of these detainees was released prior to the CSRT process. Meanwhile, of the 24 detainees who are citizens of

<sup>19</sup> See Appendix A, p. 21.

traditional US allies, all but 3 have been released as of 2007. Comparing the mean release dates of these three groups cements this picture: on average, citizens of traditional US allies are released one year earlier than citizens of post-Soviet nations, who are in turn released 10 months prior to Arab nationals.<sup>20</sup>

The post-Soviet group itself represents a microcosm of the entire population. Of the 33 detainees in this group, only the Russians and Tajiks have been released in any bulk. While 70% of the Russians and Tajiks have been released, only 1 of the 8 Uzbeks have been released, and none of the Azerbaijanis, Kazakhs, or Turkmen have been released. Once again, stark differences in treatment can be seen between nationalities, which far outweigh those differences between individualized evidentiary factors.

### *C. The Special Case of Afghanistan*

The data indicates that detainees from Afghanistan are released the earliest and most frequently of all those held in Guantánamo. Well over two-thirds of all detainees from Afghanistan were transferred or released by late 2006. Of this number, over 42% were released to freedom. The proportion of Afghans released to freedom or transferred, compared to detainees from all other nations, shows that the best chance a detainee had of being released was to be an Afghan national. This discovery is interesting in light of the “Fact Sheet” published by the Department of Defense dated June 13, 2008. This publication claims that those “known or suspected of returning to terrorist activities” those transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan generally have reengaged in local, anti-coalition activity.<sup>21</sup> Of the ten people listed in this release, six are from Afghanistan. However, despite this claimed recidivism on the part of

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<sup>20</sup> *Id.*

<sup>21</sup> Document can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/d20080613Returntothefightfactsheet.pdf>.

Afghanis formerly detained at Guantánamo, Afghanis represent the greatest number of those released to freedom.

***D. Nationality Determines Chance of Release, Not Alleged Level of Danger***

Although there may be other explanations, the Department of Defense has yet to offer them. Absent such an explanation, the conclusion seems inescapable that the detainees' country of origin determines their chance of release, not their alleged degree of danger.

**V. Any Correlation between Release Date and Government Evidence is a Result of the Government's Decision to Release Based upon Nationality.**

The slight correlations between release date and nexus, association, and hostile acts can be explained by reviewing the composition of those factors by nationality. The mean release dates show that fighters are released slightly earlier than members or associates, while those with no alleged nexus are released significantly earlier. However, of the 10 detainees not alleged to have any nexus, 9 were Afghani. Afghanis overall are released much earlier than other nationalities. Because Afghanis make up only 28% of the total population, the early release of the “none alleged” category is a result of their being predominantly Afghani. For it to be otherwise, the Afghani population in Guantánamo would have to be proportional to their percentage of detainees without any nexus alleged: 90%. In comparison, of the 49 detainees alleged to be fighters, more than 50% are Afghanis, Pakistanis, and Saudis, who were released much earlier than the other top 6 nationalities. Meanwhile, Yemen and Algeria contribute only 16% of the “fighter” category, while contributing 24% and 26% of the “associated with” and “member” categories, respectively.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See Appendix A, p. 23.

Yemen and Algeria, who combined have 133 detainees in Guantánamo, have only seen a total of 9 releases. This implies that the slight correlation between nexus and release date is likely a product of random sampling within nationalities, rather than a secondary criterion of release. In addition, the slight correlation between association and release date is similarly a product of nationality. As with nexus, the 10 detainees not alleged to be associated with any organization are 90% Afghani. Thus, their earlier release is not a product of a lack of association, but is rather a product of their nationality.

The slightly earlier release of Taliban, relative to the “al Qaeda,” “al Qaeda & Taliban,” and “al Qaeda or Taliban” categories, is also explained by national composition. Yemen and Algeria combined are only 17% of the “Taliban” category, while together composing 31%, 25%, and 35% of “al Qaeda,” “al Qaeda & Taliban,” and “al Qaeda or Taliban” categories, respectively. Meanwhile, Afghanistan contributes 38% of the “Taliban” category, compared to 3%, 20%, and 15% of the other categories. Thus, the relatively early release of Taliban is likely a product of the distinct treatment of Afghanis versus Yemenis and Algerians.

In fact, the slight correlation between association and release date would likely be much stronger, if it were not for the contribution of the Saudis. Saudis make up 22% of the “Taliban” category, just over 30% of “al Qaeda,” and 27% of “al Qaeda & Taliban,” but only 13% of “al Qaeda or Taliban.” Though Saudis are released earlier than Yemenis and Algerians, they still have a median *MaxDate* of Nov. 19, 2006. This date, later than that of the Afghanis, mitigates the average release dates.<sup>23</sup>

The 59-day difference in mean *MaxDate* between those who were and were not alleged to have committed hostile acts is also likely a product of nationality. The proportion of Yemeni in each category is most salient here: Yemenis make up 25% of those alleged to have committed

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<sup>23</sup> See *Id.* at 24.

hostile acts, but only 14% of those who were not. Conversely, Afghanis make up 24.5% of those who were not alleged to have committed hostile acts, and only 20% of those who were. Saudis again play a mitigating role, contributing 26% of those alleged to have committed a hostile act, and 21.5% of those who were not.<sup>24</sup>

Because the correlation between average release date and each of these factors is explainable as a product of the national composition of their categories, these correlations are not causal in nature. Therefore, this leaves nationality as the only known causal factor that determines the date of release.

## **VI. Conclusion—Evidence against Detainees was Not Used to Justify Continued Detention**


A review of the Department of Defense's own data reveals that there is not a consistent practice of releasing detainees based on their alleged association to al Qaeda and/or the Taliban. In addition, the number of charges against any given detainee does not seem to affect his release date. Instead, the only constant correlation to detainees who are released earlier than others is the nationality of those released. A finding that the only causal relation to release date is nationality shows that either the Department of Defense never believed their own allegations for the basis of detention, or that they knowingly released individuals they believed to be dangerous.

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<sup>24</sup> See *Id.* at 25.

**Date of Arrival at Guantanamo**


The dates of detainees initial weighings provides a reasonable approximation of arrival at Guantanamo. As shown below, the first detainees arrived at Guantanamo in early 2002, the majority had arrived by mid 2002, and by 2004, very few new arrivals occurred.




## Date of Release

Date of last recorded weights provide a reasonable approximation of the date of release, as a comparison with the total number of releases published by the DoD shows.

### Last Weighing




### DoD Published Number of Releases




### Detainee Release Date Model



The Detainee Release Date Model combines the DoD published release data, detainee nationality, and detainee weight data to form a reasonably reliable estimation of the actual release date of every detainee released from Guantanamo from 2002 through 2006.







# Detainee Release Date Model by Nationality

Individual nation charts are scaled to the approximate total number of detainees of the nationality held at Guantanamo.













## Release Dates (MaxDate) by Nationality



For comparison, MaxDate cumulative frequency charts are presented below.




While quite similar to the model in the number of releases estimated, the MaxDate estimates releases on average 51 days prior to the date estimated under the model. In addition, because detainees are all not weighed on the same days, the MaxDate charts appear less blocky. The blockiness of the model date charts is a product of the DoD's history of releasing many detainees of the same nationality together.











### Percent of Population per Year


Nexus	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Associated with</b>	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.58
<b>Fighter for</b>	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08
<b>Member</b>	0.30	0.32	0.32	0.32	0.33
<b>None alleged</b>	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
Total	1	1	1	1	1.00

Association	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
<b>Al Quida &amp; Taliban</b>	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.27	0.27
<b>Al Quida OR Taliban</b>	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.08
<b>none alleged</b>	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01
<b>other</b>	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
<b>Taliban</b>	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.22
<b>Unidentified</b>	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.07
Total	1	1	1	1	1




### Paragraph 3a Allegations

	<b>Nexus</b>	<b>Mean MaxDate</b>	<b>Median MaxDate</b>	<b>N</b>
1	None Alleged	24-Dec-05	20-Nov-06	10
2	Fighter for	4-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	48
3	Associated with	16-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	321
4	Member	30-Aug-06	20-Nov-06	176




	<b>Association</b>	<b>Mean MaxDate</b>	<b>Median MaxDate</b>	<b>N</b>
1	None Alleged	24-Dec-05	20-Mar-06	10
2	Taliban	23-Jun-06	19-Nov-06	129
3	Unidentified	24-Jun-06	19-Nov-06	42
4	Al Quida	4-Sep-06	24-Nov-06	184
5	Al Quida & Taliban	9-Sep-06	19-Nov-06	148
6	Al Quida OR Taliban	10-Oct-06	24-Nov-06	39
7	other	22-Nov-06	24-Nov-06	3




**Percent of Population per Year**

<b>3a Counts</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
0	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21
1	1.79	2.29	2.18	1.86	1.67
2	7.38	7.24	6.91	6.88	6.90
3	14.77	15.05	15.27	15.24	15.90
4	17.45	17.52	17.27	17.29	17.78
5	14.32	14.67	14.00	14.13	13.60
6	11.41	11.05	11.09	10.78	10.04
7	10.29	10.48	10.55	10.78	11.09
8	10.07	9.90	10.18	10.41	10.46
9	4.25	4.19	4.55	4.46	4.81
10	2.91	2.67	2.55	2.60	2.51
11	2.01	1.90	2.18	2.23	1.88
12	0.89	0.76	0.73	0.74	0.84
13	0.67	0.76	0.91	0.93	0.84
14	0.67	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.42
15	0.45	0.38	0.55	0.56	0.63
16	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21
23	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>




### Percent of Population per Year

3b Counts	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
0	50.34	52.19	53.27	53.90	50.63
1	8.28	8.38	8.00	7.99	9.00
2	15.88	14.86	14.55	14.50	15.27
3	15.21	14.86	14.36	14.13	15.69
4	6.26	5.71	5.64	5.20	5.23
5	2.24	2.48	2.36	2.42	2.30
6	0.45	0.38	0.36	0.37	0.42
7	0.89	0.76	0.91	0.93	1.05
8	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21
10	0.22	0.19	0.18	0.19	0.21
12			0.18	0.19	
Total	100	100	100	100	100




### Number of Statements Supporting Allegation of Association

3a Counts	Mean Maxdate	Median MaxDate	N
0	6-Feb-06	6-Feb-06	1
1	13-Mar-06	26-Oct-06	12
2	18-Aug-06	22-Nov-06	39
3	19-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	86
4	31-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	95
5	14-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	78
6	16-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	62
7	6-Sep-06	22-Nov-06	58
8	17-Sep	24-Nov-06	57
9	17-Sep	19-Nov-06	25
10	19-Jun-06	19-Oct-06	14
11	15-Jun-06	10-Nov-06	12
12	23-Nov-06	23-Nov-06	4
13	12-Aug-06	24-Nov-06	5
14	29-Jan-06	18-Nov-06	3
15	30-Nov-06	19-Nov-06	3
16	10-Dec-06	10-Dec-06	1
23	19-Nov-06	19-Nov-06	1
Total	12-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	556




**Number of Statements Supporting Allegation of Hostile Acts**

3b Counts	Mean Maxdate	Median MaxDate	N
0	19-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	295
1	4-Oct-06	19-Nov-06	44
2	16-Sep-06	19-Nov-06	81
3	17-Sep-06	24-Nov-06	80
4	7-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	32
5	9-Aug-06	24-Nov-06	14
6	11-Nov-06	19-Nov-06	2
7	28-Nov-06	28-Nov-06	5
8	15-Dec-06	15-Dec-06	1
10	26-Nov-06	26-Nov-06	1
12	15-Jan-05	15-Jan-05	1
Total	12-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	556




### Detainees Who Received CSRT

	Citizenship	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
1	Pakistan	7-Sep-05	15-Feb-05
2	Traditional Allies	14-May-05	30-Jan-05
3	Afghanistan	31-May-06	15-Nov-06
4	Reg. Post-Soviet	28-Oct-06	28-Nov-06
5	Total Population	17-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
6	Saudi	18-Sep-06	19-Nov-06
7	Arab Nations	2-Oct-06	24-Nov-06
8	China	4-Sep-06	24-Nov-06
9	Yemen	13-Nov-06	24-Nov-06
10	Algeria	18-Nov-06	25-Nov-06





### Total Population

	Citizenship	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
1	Pakistan	13-Jul-04	15-Aug-04
2	Traditional Allies	20-Nov-04	1-Jan-05
3	Afghanistan	30-Mar-05	1-Apr-05
4	Reg. Post-Soviet	18-Oct-05	19-Nov-06
5	Total Population	7-Dec-05	15-Nov-06
6	Saudi	3-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
7	Arab Nations	4-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
8	China	4-Sep-06	24-Nov-06
9	Yemen	4-Nov-06	24-Nov-06
10	Algeria	18-Nov-06	25-Nov-06



Percent of Population per Year

Citizenship	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Afghanistan	18.73	25.36	23.82	21.79	19.29
Pakistan	8.51	9.31	6.87	1.83	1.66
Saudi	20.74	19.20	19.85	23.81	26.14
Yemen	15.63	14.76	16.18	19.23	21.58
Algeria	3.10	3.01	3.82	4.58	4.98
Reg. Post-Soviet	4.80	4.58	5.04	3.85	3.94
Traditional Allies	3.41	3.30	3.51	2.20	0.62
Arab Nations	55.11	52.15	55.73	64.65	69.50




**Percent of Population per Year**

<b>Citizenship</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2006</b>
Afghanistan	18.73	25.36	23.82	21.79	19.29
Algeria	3.10	3.01	3.82	4.58	4.98
Australia	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.18	0.21
Azerbaijan	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Bahrain	0.77	0.86	0.92	0.92	0.62
Bangladesh	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Belgium	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.37	0.00
Bosnia	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Canada	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Chad	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
China	3.41	3.15	3.36	4.03	3.94
Denmark	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.00	0.00
Egypt	0.77	0.57	0.61	0.73	0.62
Ethiopia	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.18	0.21
France	1.08	1.00	1.07	0.73	0.00
Iran	0.46	0.43	0.46	0.37	0.21
Iraq	0.77	1.00	1.07	1.10	1.24
Jordan	0.93	1.15	0.92	0.92	0.83
Kazakstan	0.46	0.43	0.46	0.55	0.62
Kuwait	1.55	1.43	1.83	2.01	1.45
Lebanon	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Libya	1.70	1.58	1.68	2.01	2.28
Maldives	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.00
Mauritania	0.46	0.43	0.46	0.55	0.41
Morocco	2.32	2.01	1.98	1.65	1.45
Pakistan	8.51	9.31	6.87	1.83	1.66
Pakistan/Afghanistan	0.15	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pakistan/Bangladesh	0.15	0.29	0.00	0.00	0.00
Qatar	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
Russia	1.08	1.00	1.22	0.55	0.21
Saudi	20.74	19.20	19.85	23.81	26.14
Saudi/USA	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Somalia	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.37	0.41
Spain	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.00	0.00
Sudan	1.55	1.58	1.53	1.65	1.66
Sweden	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.00	0.00
Syria	1.39	1.43	1.53	1.65	1.87
Tajikistan	1.70	1.72	1.83	1.10	1.24
Tunisia	1.70	1.58	1.68	2.01	2.28
Turkey	0.77	0.72	0.46	0.37	0.21
Turkmenistan	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.21
UAE	0.31	0.29	0.31	0.37	0.41
Uganda	0.15	0.14	0.15	0.18	0.00
UK	1.08	1.15	1.22	0.73	0.21
Uzbekistan	1.24	1.15	1.22	1.28	1.45
West Bank	0.62	0.57	0.61	0.55	0.62
Yemen	15.63	14.76	16.18	19.23	21.58


# Nexus Composition

Note: Afghans make up 90% of "none alleged," and Afghans and Saudis (released relatively earlier) make up 45% of "fighters". Compare this with the relatively higher number of Yemeni and Algerians (rarely ever released) in the "member" and "associated with" categories. Also note the Pakistanis' contribution to each category: high in "fighters", lower in "members", and very low in "associated with".




# Association Composition

Note: Again, "none alleged" is 90% composed of Afghans. Also, compare the Yemen and Algerian contribution to each category. Highest contribution occurs in "Al Qaeda", "Al Qaeda & Taliban", and "Al Qaeda OR Taliban". Their contribution to "Taliban" is significantly lower. Saudi contributions to "Taliban" and "Al Qaeda OR Taliban" are also significantly lower than those in "Al Qaeda" and "Al Qaeda & Taliban."



# Hostile Acts Composition

Note: The Yemeni contribution to the "Hostile Acts" category is significantly higher than to the "No Hostile Acts" category. Also note the inverse levels of contribution to each category from Afghans and Saudis (both released early relative to Yemenis, but Saudis released late relative to Afghans).




## Appendix B

### Total CTC Dangerousness Factors

While at first glance, the sum total of all CTC dangerousness factors appears to bear a positive correlation to mean release date, this correlation is at best very weak, and most likely not statistically non-existent. The mean *MaxDate* varies between categories by no more than six months, except for the single individual who has met 9 of the 12 factors. In comparison to the variation that occurs between other groups, such as nationality, this is a very narrow window.

Additionally, the expected positive correlation does not occur at all among the median *MaxDates*. Indeed, the only category with a median *MaxDate* prior to November 2006 is the group of 6 individuals who did not meet any of the CTC's factors, and this group's median *MaxDate* is as late as 28 October, 2006.

Total Factors	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate	N
0	9-Jun-06	28-Oct-06	6
1	4-May-06	17-Nov-06	26
2	17-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	61
3	30-Jun-06	19-Nov-06	90
4	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	95
5	27-Sep-06	24-Nov-06	109
6	18-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	81
7	9-Oct-06	24-Nov-06	37
8	26-Jun-06	21-Nov-06	10
9	14-Dec-06	14-Dec-06	1
Total	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	516



### CTC Dangerousness Factors by Level

Like the combined CTC factors, looking at the factors by CTC's dangerousness levels presents an apparent correlation between the release date and dangerousness. However, close inspection dispels this notion. For the "high threat" level, the mean *MaxDate* varies among the categories by no more than 45 days, and the median *MaxDates* lie in November 2006 in every category. This is the very picture of the entire population who had a CSRT, with a mean *MaxDate* of 9 August, 2006, and a median of 19 November, 2006.




The "medium threat" and "low threat" levels paint similar pictures once it is noted that they have insignificantly small numbers of individuals meeting all 4 factors. Discounting these insignificant

categories, the total variation between categories is again exceedingly small. The “low threat” level presents the greatest variation at 82 days. When compared to the variations between other groupings, such as nationality, this difference in means is vanishingly small.

High	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate	N
0	12-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	139
1	5-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	125
2	28-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	123
3	21-Aug-06	24-Nov-06	83
4	30-Aug-06	24-Nov-06	46
Total	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	516

Medium	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate	N
0	18-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	111
1	10-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	216
2	24-Aug-06	20-Nov-06	142
3	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	45
4	12-Oct-06	12-Oct-06	2
Total	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	516

Low	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate	N
0	11-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	119
1	24-Jul-06	19-Nov-06	250
2	1-Oct-06	19-Nov-06	120
3	20-Sep-06	24-Nov-06	26
4	10-Dec-06	10-Dec-06	1
Total	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06	516



## CTC Dangerousness Factors Between Levels

As noted in the main text, comparing the CTC’s dangerousness factors across levels presents the shocking picture that the connection between the CTC factors and release date may run in reverse: among those with the most factors supporting dangerousness, those of higher threat levels are released earlier than those in lower threat levels. This phenomenon can be seen in the later mean *MaxDates* of those who have met 2, 3, and 4 factors in the “low threat” level compared to those who have met the same number of factors in the higher threat levels.

0	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
High	12-Jul-06	19-Nov-06
Medium	18-Jul-06	19-Nov-06
Low	11-Jul-06	19-Nov-06



1	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
High	5-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
Medium	10-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
Low	24-Jul-06	19-Nov-06




2	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
High	28-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
Medium	24-Aug-06	20-Nov-06
Low	1-Oct-06	19-Nov-06

3	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
High	21-Aug-06	24-Nov-06
Medium	9-Aug-06	19-Nov-06
Low	20-Sep-06	24-Nov-06

4	Mean MaxDate	Median MaxDate
High	30-Aug-06	24-Nov-06
Medium	12-Oct-06	12-Oct-06
Low	10-Dec-06	10-Dec-06

In each of the following graphs, the “low threat” level is signified by  $y=1$ , the “medium threat” level by  $y=2$ , and the “high threat” level by  $y=3$ .





Thus, no matter which way the data is grouped, correlation between the CTC factors and the date of release is at best very weak, and if present at all, is possibly reversed. If the CTC factors are a reasonable measure of a detainee’s dangerousness, then it is clear that the DoD is releasing detainees without regard to individualized assessments of the threat posed by the detainee. The only other conclusion is that the CTC factors are not a reasonable measure of detainee dangerousness, and by extension, neither are the government summaries of evidence against the detainee, upon which the CTC study was based.

### Methodology

The model created to estimate the release date of detainees combines publicly available information published by the DoD. This includes detainee weight data, DoD press releases announcing detainee releases and transfers, and CSRT and ARB releases. The latest date of those found in the detainee's weight data, CSRT, and ARBs was used to determine an initial approximate date of release. This date, along with the detainee's nationality (and average number of weighings per month if the detainee's final date was a weighing), was used to match the detainee's ISN to a probable release date listed on a DoD press release. Because the DoD usually listed the country of release, without stating the nationality of the detainee released, the detainee's nationality was matched to the country to which DoD released detainees on that date.<sup>1</sup>

The DoD press releases were incomplete in that many listed a total number of detainees released from Guantanamo that did not equal the sum of all previous releases published. Thus, some detainees were released without corresponding press releases. For those detainees who had been matched to a particular press release, the mean difference from the date of the last weighing to the date of release was 51 days. Thus, for those who were not matched to a press release, the date 51 days after the final weighing was used in lieu of the date listed.

Because the DoD press releases often listed released detainees in groups, the conditions of transfer (whether for continued detention, prosecution, release, or unspecified transfer) are often unknown for individual detainees. Thus the proportion of detainees transferred under each condition was used as a probabilistic measure of the

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<sup>1</sup> There are a few exceptions to the rule that the detainee's nationality was matched to the country of release. These exceptions include Palestinians from the West Bank who were matched to releases to Jordan and Chinese Uighers who were sent to Albania.

conditions of transfer for each individual detainee. For instance, if the press release stated that 3 Afghans were to be released and 2 transferred for further detention, then each of the 5 detainees matched with that press release would be listed as 0.6 under the release variable, and 0.4 under the continued detention variable. Detainees whose last recorded weight was prior to November 2006, but who were not matched with a particular press release were listed as undocumented.

### **A Note on Variables**

The last date of weighing reflected by the data is listed under the variable *MaxDate*. The *MaxDate* is not necessarily the last weighing that the detainee ever has or will receive at Guantanamo, however, since our data ends at the beginning of 2007. However, for those detainees whose last date of weighing is prior to Nov. 1, 2006, the final date is much more conclusive, given that Guantanamo Medical SOPs require monthly weighing. Thus, allowing 60 days (from the first day of the first month to the last day of the second month), the latest we can be reasonably certain to know that a detainee has been released is Oct. 2006. This is confirmed by the very large number of detainees whose *MaxDate* falls within Nov. 2006 (See *MaxDate* Chart), and the close match with the total number of releases published by the DoD at that time.

The date of a detainee's first recorded weight is listed under the variable *MinDate*. Because this weight cannot be recorded prior to the detainee's arrival at Guantanamo, and Guantanamo Medical SOP requires that incoming detainees are weighed upon arrival, the *MinDate* is a reasonable approximation of the detainee's arrival date. The population during any time period can thus be determined with reasonable certainty by filtering out those detainees whose *MinDate* is after the end of the time period, and those whose

*MaxDate* is before the beginning of the time period. This was the method used to determine the demographics of the yearly populations at Guantanamo. Because the average lag between *MaxDate* and release dates according to the model is only 51 days, this method is still reasonably accurate for purposes of comparison between dates.

### **Mean, Median, Model, and MaxDate**

Mean dates used in this study are the arithmetic mean of the number of days between the variable dates and Jan 1, 1900. Because the mean is sensitive to outliers and our dates span a 6 year period, the median date is used in conjunction with the mean to show the point at which 50% of a group have been released. Between these two, a sense of “average” behavior can be determined.

It should be noted that the median *MaxDate* of the majority of groupings lies in or after Nov. 2006. This does not mean that 50% of the detainees in that group have been released as of that date, however, since *MaxDate* is not a reliable measure of release after Oct. 2006. Instead, it can be said that a median *MaxDate* after Oct. 2006 implies that 50% of the group have *not* been released as of Nov 2006.

Dates given by the detainee’s *MaxDate* and by model dates are both used in this study because, while they provide differing values, they provide different information regarding the detainee’s history. Detainees who have not been released according to the model do not have a model date, so they are not included in the mean and median calculations. Thus, the mean and median model dates show when detainees are released, but do not provide information on those still detained. Because of this distinction, both model dates and the *MaxDate* are used to describe the timeline of detainee releases in order to avoid misinterpretation of the data in cases where a small number of detainees in

a given group are released early, yet the majority is never released at all, as is the case with Yemenis and Algerians.

Department of Defense Document Sources

Except for DoD press releases, all DoD documents used are available at <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/>

Document	URL
Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) and Administrative Review Board (ARB) Documents	<a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/index.html">http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/index.html</a>
Detainee Hospital, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)	<a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/GITMO_MedicalSOPs.pdf">http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/GITMO_MedicalSOPs.pdf</a>
Measurements of Heights and Weights of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (March 16, 2007), (DoD Weight Data)	<a href="http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/measurements/">http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/measurements/</a>
Press Release 10068	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10068">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10068</a>
Press Release 10081	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10081">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10081</a>
Press Release 10204	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10204">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10204</a>
Press Release 10293	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10293">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10293</a>
Press Release 10301	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10301">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10301</a>
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Press Release 10562	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10562">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10562</a>
Press Release 10676	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10676">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10676</a>
Press Release 10788	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10788">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10788</a>
Press Release 10898	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10898">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=10898</a>
Press Release 11030	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11030">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11030</a>
Press Release 11130	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11130">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11130</a>
Press Release 11219	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11219">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11219</a>
Press Release 11301	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11301">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11301</a>
Press Release 11367	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11367">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11367</a>

Document	URL
Press Release 11368	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11368">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11368</a>
Press Release 11455	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11455">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11455</a>
Press Release 11477	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11477">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11477</a>
Press Release 11555	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11555">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11555</a>
Press Release 11576	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11576">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11576</a>
Press Release 11591	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11591">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11591</a>
Press Release 11893	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11893">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11893</a>
Press Release 3830	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3830">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=3830</a>
Press Release 7041	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7041">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7041</a>
Press Release 7090	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7090">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7090</a>
Press Release 7100	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7100">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7100</a>
Press Release 7113	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7113">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7113</a>
Press Release 7133	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7133">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7133</a>
Press Release 7188	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7188">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7188</a>
Press Release 7532	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7532">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7532</a>
Press Release 7579	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7579">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7579</a>
Press Release 7598	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7598">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7598</a>
Press Release 7753	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7753">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7753</a>
Press Release 8133	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8133">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8133</a>
Press Release 8154	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8154">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8154</a>
Press Release 8293	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8293">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8293</a>
Press Release 8305	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8305">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8305</a>
Press Release 8403	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8403">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8403</a>

Document	URL
Press Release 8423	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8423">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8423</a>
Press Release 8705	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8705">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8705</a>
Press Release 8808	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8808">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8808</a>
Press Release 8866	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8866">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8866</a>
Press Release 8912	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8912">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=8912</a>
Press Release 9035	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9035">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9035</a>
Press Release 9047	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9047">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9047</a>
Press Release 9300	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9300">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9300</a>
Press Release 9301	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9301">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9301</a>
Press Release 9527	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseID=9527">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseID=9527</a>
Press Release 9569	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9569">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9569</a>
Press Release 9687	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9687">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9687</a>
Press Release 9865	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9865">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9865</a>
Press Release 9869	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9869">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9869</a>
Press Release 9960	<a href="http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9960">http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9960</a>

## Appendix E

The following appendix presents general data of the total population of Guantanamo, as a supplement to that found in the main text.

### Nationalities at Guantanamo

#### Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
ISN * CITIZENSHIP	773	100.0%	0	.0%	773	100.0%

N

CITIZENSHIP	ISN
Afghanistan	217
Algeria	25
Australia	2
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	6
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	2
Bosnia	1
Canada	2
Chad	1
China	22
Denmark	1
Egypt	5
Ethiopia	1
France	7
Iran	3
Iraq	8
Jordan	8
Kazakhstan	3
Kuwait	12
Lebanon	1
Libya	11
Maldives	1
Mauritania	3
Morocco	15
N/A	14
Pakistan	66
Pakistan/Afghanistan	1
Pakistan/Bangladesh	1
Qatar	1
Russia	8
Saudi	137
Saudi/USA	1
Somalia	2
Spain	1
Sudan	11
Sweden	1
Syria	10
Tajikistan	12
Tunisia	11
Turkey	5
Turkmenistan	1
UAE	2
Uganda	1
UK	8
Uzbekistan	8
West Bank	4
Yemen	108
Total	773

# Average Release Dates By Nationality

## Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
MaxOfCLEAN_DATE * CITIZENSHIP	768	99.4%	5	.6%	773	100.0%
Model * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%

## Case Summaries

CITIZENSHIP		MaxDate (final weighing)	Model
Afghanistan	Mean	30-MAR-2005	05-SEP-2004
	Median	01-APR-2005	15-MAR-2004
Algeria	Mean	18-NOV-2006	22-OCT-2005
	Median	25-NOV-2006	22-OCT-2005
Australia	Mean	02-OCT-2005	05-OCT-2004
	Median	02-OCT-2005	05-OCT-2004
Azerbaijan	Mean	19-NOV-2006	
	Median	19-NOV-2006	
Bahrain	Mean	02-MAR-2006	07-NOV-2005
	Median	11-APR-2006	05-NOV-2005
Bangladesh	Mean	10-DEC-2006	
	Median	10-DEC-2006	
Belgium	Mean	15-APR-2005	26-APR-2005
	Median	15-APR-2005	26-APR-2005
Bosnia	Mean	28-NOV-2006	
	Median	28-NOV-2006	
Canada	Mean	02-DEC-2006	
	Median	02-DEC-2006	
Chad	Mean	24-NOV-2006	
	Median	24-NOV-2006	
China	Mean	04-SEP-2006	21-MAR-2006
	Median	24-NOV-2006	23-FEB-2006
Denmark	Mean	15-FEB-2004	25-FEB-2004
	Median	15-FEB-2004	25-FEB-2004
Egypt	Mean	08-JUN-2005	31-AUG-2004
	Median	01-MAY-2005	21-APR-2005
Ethiopia	Mean	19-NOV-2006	
	Median	19-NOV-2006	
France	Mean	18-NOV-2004	18-DEC-2004
	Median	15-JAN-2005	07-MAR-2005
Iran	Mean	23-JUN-2005	04-AUG-2005
	Median	15-JUN-2005	22-AUG-2005
Iraq	Mean	26-JUN-2006	27-JUN-2005
	Median	19-NOV-2006	27-JUN-2005
Jordan	Mean	10-AUG-2005	01-JUN-2004
	Median	15-MAR-2006	19-FEB-2004
Kazakhstan	Mean	06-DEC-2006	
	Median	10-DEC-2006	
Kuwait	Mean	15-APR-2006	30-JAN-2006
	Median	16-JUL-2006	03-NOV-2005

### Case Summaries

CITIZENSHIP		MaxDate (final weighing)	Model
Lebanon	Mean	02-DEC-2006	
	Median	02-DEC-2006	
Libya	Mean	29-NOV-2006	
	Median	28-NOV-2006	
Maldives	Mean	01-MAR-2005	12-MAR-2005
	Median	01-MAR-2005	12-MAR-2005
Mauritania	Mean	06-MAY-2006	21-APR-2005
	Median	19-NOV-2006	21-APR-2005
Morocco	Mean	23-JUN-2005	10-JAN-2005
	Median	15-JUN-2005	02-AUG-2004
N/A	Mean	04-MAR-2007	
	Median	04-MAR-2007	
Pakistan	Mean	13-JUL-2004	30-JUN-2004
	Median	15-AUG-2004	18-SEP-2004
Pakistan/Afghanistan	Mean	29-JUN-2003	19-AUG-2003
	Median	29-JUN-2003	19-AUG-2003
Pakistan/Bangladesh	Mean	15-JUN-2003	05-AUG-2003
	Median	15-JUN-2003	05-AUG-2003
Qatar	Mean	19-NOV-2006	
	Median	19-NOV-2006	
Russia	Mean	22-OCT-2004	04-AUG-2004
	Median	15-FEB-2004	01-MAR-2004
Saudi	Mean	03-AUG-2006	15-DEC-2005
	Median	19-NOV-2006	18-MAY-2006
Saudi/USA	Mean	04-APR-2002	25-MAY-2002
	Median	04-APR-2002	25-MAY-2002
Somalia	Mean	17-NOV-2006	
	Median	17-NOV-2006	
Spain	Mean	15-JAN-2004	06-MAR-2004
	Median	15-JAN-2004	06-MAR-2004
Sudan	Mean	31-MAR-2006	09-AUG-2004
	Median	21-NOV-2006	02-APR-2004
Sweden	Mean	15-APR-2004	08-JUL-2004
	Median	15-APR-2004	08-JUL-2004
Syria	Mean	15-AUG-2006	24-APR-2004
	Median	21-NOV-2006	24-APR-2004
Tajikistan	Mean	21-JUN-2005	20-JUL-2004
	Median	14-DEC-2004	02-APR-2004
Tunisia	Mean	24-NOV-2006	
	Median	19-NOV-2006	
Turkey	Mean	06-AUG-2004	19-SEP-2004
	Median	05-MAR-2004	02-APR-2004
Turkmenistan	Mean	22-NOV-2006	
	Median	22-NOV-2006	
UAE	Mean	19-NOV-2006	
	Median	19-NOV-2006	
Uganda	Mean	16-DEC-2005	05-FEB-2006
	Median	16-DEC-2005	05-FEB-2006
UK	Mean	06-AUG-2004	12-SEP-2004
	Median	08-AUG-2004	03-SEP-2004
Uzbekistan	Mean	29-JUL-2006	05-MAY-2004
	Median	28-NOV-2006	05-MAY-2004

### Case Summaries

CITIZENSHIP		MaxDate (final weighing)	Model
West Bank	Mean	19-MAR-2006	02-APR-2004
	Median	19-NOV-2006	02-APR-2004
Yemen	Mean	04-NOV-2006	13-MAY-2006
	Median	24-NOV-2006	17-DEC-2006
Total	Mean	07-DEC-2005	04-DEC-2004
	Median	15-NOV-2006	18-SEP-2004

# Conditions of Release versus Nationality

## Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
continued detention * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Prosecution * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Release * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Transfer to government * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
NoDoc * CITIZENSHIP	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%

## Case Summaries

CITIZENSHIP		continued detention	Prosecution	Release	Transfer to government	NoDoc
Afghanistan	N	149	149	149	149	149
	Mean	.01	.00	.42	.20	.36
Algeria	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Australia	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Bahrain	N	4	4	4	4	4
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.75	.25
Belgium	N	2	2	2	2	2
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
China	N	6	6	6	6	6
	Mean	.00	.00	.83	.00	.17
Denmark	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
Egypt	N	3	3	3	3	3
	Mean	.00	.00	.33	.00	.67
France	N	7	7	7	7	7
	Mean	.00	.29	.00	.43	.29
Iran	N	3	3	3	3	3
	Mean	.00	.00	.33	.33	.33
Iraq	N	2	2	2	2	2
	Mean	.00	.00	.50	.00	.50
Jordan	N	4	4	4	4	4
	Mean	.00	.00	.50	.00	.50
Kuwait	N	8	8	8	8	8
	Mean	.00	.13	.00	.75	.13
Maldives	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Mauritania	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Morocco	N	11	11	11	11	11
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.64	.36
Pakistan	N	61	61	61	61	61
	Mean	.41	.00	.07	.12	.39
Pakistan/Afghanistan	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00

**Case Summaries**

CITIZENSHIP		continued detention	Prosecution	Release	Transfer to government	NoDoc
Pakistan/Bangladesh	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Russia	N	7	7	7	7	7
	Mean	.71	.00	.00	.00	.29
Saudi	N	42	42	42	42	42
	Mean	.00	.00	.14	.79	.07
Saudi/USA	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Spain	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Sudan	N	3	3	3	3	3
	Mean	.00	.00	.67	.00	.33
Sweden	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Syria	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
Tajikistan	N	7	7	7	7	7
	Mean	.00	.00	.57	.00	.29
Turkey	N	5	5	5	5	5
	Mean	.00	.00	.40	.00	.60
Uganda	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
UK	N	8	8	8	8	8
	Mean	.00	.00	.50	.50	.00
Uzbekistan	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	.00	.00	1.00
West Bank	N	1	1	1	1	1
	Mean	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Yemen	N	8	8	8	8	8
	Mean	.00	.00	.29	.58	.13
Total	N	354	354	354	354	354
	Mean	.09	.01	.28	.29	.32

# Conditions of Release versus Association and Nexus

## Case Processing Summary

	Cases					
	Included		Excluded		Total	
	N	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent
continued detention * Assoc * Nexus	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Prosecution * Assoc * Nexus	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Release * Assoc * Nexus	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
Transfer to government * Assoc * Nexus	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%
NoDoc * Assoc * Nexus	354	45.8%	419	54.2%	773	100.0%

### Case Summaries

Assoc	Nexus		continued detention	Prosecution	Release
		N	197	197	197
		Mean	.13	.00	.30
	Total	N	197	197	197
		Mean	.13	.00	.30
0	0	N	1	1	1
		Mean	.00	.00	.00
	Total	N	1	1	1
		Mean	.00	.00	.00
Al Quida	associated with	N	27	27	27
		Mean	.03	.00	.15
	fighter for	N	4	4	4
		Mean	.00	.25	.00
	member	N	12	12	12
		Mean	.00	.08	.08
	Total	N	43	43	43
		Mean	.02	.05	.12
Al Quida & Taliban	associated with	N	23	23	23
		Mean	.00	.00	.31
	fighter for	N	2	2	2
		Mean	.00	.00	.00
	member	N	7	7	7
		Mean	.00	.00	.00
	Total	N	32	32	32
		Mean	.00	.00	.22
Al Quida OR Taliban	associated with	N	5	5	5
		Mean	.00	.00	.43
	member	N	1	1	1
		Mean	.00	.00	.00
	Total	N	6	6	6
		Mean	.00	.00	.36
none alleged	none alleged	N	6	6	6
		Mean	.00	.00	.67
	Total	N	6	6	6
		Mean	.00	.00	.67
Taliban	associated with	N	19	19	19
		Mean	.04	.05	.21
	fighter for	N	11	11	11
		Mean	.23	.00	.18
	member	N	21	21	21
		Mean	.04	.00	.33
	Total	N	51	51	51
		Mean	.08	.02	.25
Unidentified	associated with	N	14	14	14
		Mean	.00	.00	.57
	member	N	4	4	4
		Mean	.00	.00	.25
	Total	N	18	18	18
		Mean	.00	.00	.50
Total		N	197	197	197
		Mean	.13	.00	.30
	0	N	1	1	1
		Mean	.00	.00	.00

### Case Summaries

Assoc	Nexus		continued detention	Prosecution	Release
Total	associated with	N	88	88	88
		Mean	.02	.01	.29
	fighter for	N	17	17	17
		Mean	.15	.06	.12
	member	N	45	45	45
		Mean	.02	.02	.20
	none alleged	N	6	6	6
		Mean	.00	.00	.67
	Total	N	354	354	354
		Mean		.09	.01

### Case Summaries

Assoc	Nexus		Transfer to government	NoDoc
		N	197	197
		Mean	.07	.48
	Total	N	197	197
		Mean	.07	.48
0	0	N	1	1
		Mean	1.00	.00
	Total	N	1	1
		Mean	1.00	.00
Al Quida	associated with	N	27	27
		Mean	.64	.19
	fighter for	N	4	4
		Mean	.50	.25
	member	N	12	12
		Mean	.75	.08
Total	N	43	43	
	Mean	.66	.16	
Al Quida & Taliban	associated with	N	23	23
		Mean	.51	.17
	fighter for	N	2	2
		Mean	1.00	.00
	member	N	7	7
		Mean	.86	.14
Total	N	32	32	
	Mean	.62	.16	
Al Quida OR Taliban	associated with	N	5	5
		Mean	.37	.20
	member	N	1	1
		Mean	.00	1.00
Total	N	6	6	
	Mean	.31	.33	
none alleged	none alleged	N	6	6
		Mean	.17	.17
	Total	N	6	6
	Mean	.17	.17	
Taliban	associated with	N	19	19
		Mean	.54	.16
	fighter for	N	11	11
		Mean	.59	.00
	member	N	21	21
		Mean	.63	.00
Total	N	51	51	
	Mean	.59	.06	
Unidentified	associated with	N	14	14
		Mean	.36	.07
	member	N	4	4
		Mean	.75	.00
Total	N	18	18	
	Mean	.44	.06	
Total		N	197	197
		Mean	.07	.48
	0	N	1	1
		Mean	1.00	.00

### Case Summaries

Assoc	Nexus		Transfer to government	NoDoc
Total	associated with	N	88	88
		Mean	.52	.16
	fighter for	N	17	17
		Mean	.62	.06
	member	N	45	45
		Mean	.69	.07
	none alleged	N	6	6
		Mean	.17	.17
	Total	N	354	354
		Mean	.29	.32